Abstract
Introduction
The question of who holds the reins in a country and determines the direction of public policy has always fascinated academic scholars and political theorists (e.g. already Aristotle 4th-centruy BC; Machiavelli 1532). In democracies, the basic principle of rule of the people entails that the will of the population has to be translated in some way into policy outcomes. However, it is debatable how these translation processes occur and which channels between the people and the state are the main platforms of policy-creation.
Some scholars have argued that governments have a significant degree of discretion in policycreation and that their ideological orientation is the central determinant for policy outcomes (e.g. Bearce 2003; Bjørnskov 2008; Potrafke 2009 ). They assume that governments are mainly motivated by policy-seeking goals and always try to implement their favored policies. Other scholars doubt the discretionary power of politicians and emphasize the crucial impact of powerful interest groups (e.g. Berger 1983; Lijphart 1975; Pizzorno 1981) . In this vein, Becker has once compared the role of politicians with managers of firms. He argued that politicians are hired to further the collective interests of pressure groups, who could fire or repudiate them with the next elections in case they deviate from their interests (Becker 1983, 396) . According to this logic, politicians are reduced to mere puppets which have to serve the interests of powerful groups in the society.
The question who determines the direction of a country is in particular relevant with regard to highly controversial topics where conflicting interests are competing with each other. One of those topics is the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability which each state faces in an environment of international capital mobility (Mundell 1964) . While it is beneficial for some groups in society to pursue an autonomous monetary policy, others held a distinct preference for stable exchange rates. This paper aims to shed light on the translation of societal preferences into policy outcomes with focus on exactly this dilemma of monetary policy. Consequently, this analysis aims to answer the following research question: (Bearce 2003) . Bearce argues in his influential paper that the ideology of government parties is the central determinant for the decision in the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange-rate stability. Based on a principal-agent model he suggests that leftist parties are the agents of all societal groups which prefer monetary policy autonomy and that rightist parties are the agents of all societal groups with a preference for exchange-rate stability. Thus, he concludes that the partisan character of a government determines the monetary policy of a country whereas he regards the size and strength of different societal groups as irrelevant. He underpins this assumption with empirical evidence of twenty-two OECD countries in the period between 1975 and 1992 and he supplies his findings with further evidence from a historical case study about lobbying for monetary policy in the US. His quantitative evidence illustrates that the ideology of government parties is indeed the central determinant for a country's monetary policy and that the strength of different societal groups emphasized by the economic pluralism is of minor importance. However, his analysis is based on several theoretical and methodological flaws which will be elucidated in the following. In particular, a re-analysis of his study with a newer dataset and a more sophisticated measure of the central explanatory variable will demonstrate that the power and willingness of government parties to shape the monetary policy of a country is actually smaller than previously thought. This paper will proceed in the following way. First, the Mundell-Fleming model -which represents the foundation of this study -will be introduced. Secondly, I will demonstrate with several theories about preference formation why different actors in the society have different priorities regarding monetary policies. In a next step, the two central theories for the translation of societal preferences into policy outcomes will be contrasted with each other. Hereby, I will critically discuss Bearce's party-as-agent model and its implications. Afterwards, I will explain in the methods section the databases and the statistical model used for this re-analysis. Hereby, I will supply a times-series crosssectional OLS regression analysis with a fixed effects model which accounts for several problems of pooled data. Finally, I will summarize the findings and explain why economic pluralism is still the dominant theory for the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes.
1.)
The implications of the Mundell-Fleming trilemma for monetary policy
The Mundell-Fleming model of international macroeconomics was developed by Robert A. Mundell (Mundell 1960 / 1961a / 1961b / 1963 / 1964 ) and Marcus Fleming (1962 . Its central contribution was the systematic analysis of the impact of international capital mobility on determining the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies under different exchange rate regimes (Frenkel and Razin 1987, 567) . The core of the Mundell-Fleming model is the so-called "impossible trilemma" (Aizenman 2011 ) which posits that economies cannot simultaneously maintain free capital movement, a fixed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy.
Marcus Fleming argued in his seminal study on international macroeconomics that the stimulus to employment, income, and output resulting from a given increase in public expenditure will be larger with a floating exchange rate than with a fixed one (Fleming 1962, 372) . Underpinning this assumption, Robert Mundell demonstrated that under a floating exchange rate monetary expansion puts downward pressure on the interest rate and induces capital outflow, further depreciating the exchange rate and creating an export surplus, which in turn increases, via the multiplier effect, income and employment (Mundell 1963) . Hence, Mundell showed that monetary policy becomes a powerful tool of stabilization policy under flexible exchange rates when the condition of capital mobility is given (Mundell 1963) . The same impact cannot be achieved under a fixed exchange rate since the maintenance of the exchange rate thwarts the effect triggered by a depreciation of the currency. The contemporary international economy is characterized by a great mobility of capital across national borders (Frieden 1991) , i.e. the condition of capital mobility is fulfilled for almost all developed economies. Thus, the choice of any exchange-rate system in each country is based on the trade-off between domestic economic independence on the one hand and exchange-rate stability on the other (Oatley 2012, 205) .
The question arises which of those two conflicting monetary policy goals is more desirable for states.
It can be assumed that in democratic states the choice for one of those monetary policy goals is determined by societal preferences since the people should be the sovereign of the country.
Therefore, I will discuss in the next section how societal preferences towards the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability emerge and which opposing interests are competing.
2.) Societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes
To understand how societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes emerge, it is necessary to identify different societal actors which are affected in distinct ways by the degree of realization of the conflicting monetary policy goals. Since the impact on societal actors is of economic nature, it makes sense to differentiate them according to their economic activities. I follow hereby the classification scheme from Bearce by identifying different economic actors under the frameworks of economic sectors and production factors.
The idea of production factors is based on the influential Heckscher-Ohlin model. This model assumes that all factors of production within countries are mobile across sectors, that there are constant returns to scale in production and that markets are perfectly competitive (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, 427) . Based on those assumptions, the Heckscher-Ohlin model distinguishes in its basic form between two main production factors, namely capital and labor. While the model was originally developed to explain trade policy preferences (Oatley 2012, 70f.) , diverging preferences of capital and labor can be also identified with regards to other national economic policies. In this vein, it has been argued that the production factor labor is more tied to the local economy than capital and that it therefore prefers domestic monetary autonomy (Kapstein 1996) . This can be explained by the fact that domestic actors can benefit from currency depreciations processes induced by monetary policies. And because of its prevailing domestic economic activity, the production factor labor is less affected by varying exchange rates. In the contrary, the production factor capital has a highly mobile nature. Therefore, it relies more on stable exchange rates and less on an autonomous monetary policy by national states which shapes its preference the other way around. Taken together, the framework of production factors predicts that capital has a preference for exchange rate stability whereas labor holds a preference for domestic monetary policy autonomy.
In a second step, I will consider the differentiation of economic sectors emphasized by the RicardoViner model. The Ricardo-Viner model assumes, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, that factor specificity is very high, i.e. that some factors cannot move at all among industries (Alt et al. 1996, 690) . Consequently, we except coalitions to form not along the lines of factors but along the lines of export-versus import-competing industries or sectors (Alt et al. 1996, 692) . Labor and capital interests within a sector can be expected to unite since these factors are specific to the respective sector (Bearce 2003, 367) . The advantages of a fixed exchange rate are that cross-border trade, payments and investments become more predictable (Hefeker 1998, 6) . This is in particular advantageous to the export sector which therefore holds a strong preference for exchange rate stability. If companies rely on the export of their goods, they prefer a certain degree of reliability of currency movements to anticipate their future revenues. The same applies to international investors and the banking sector which also depend on transactions across currencies. The downside of exchange rate stability is that the currency cannot be depreciated to make domestic goods more competitive (Hefeker 1998, 6) . Consequently, companies operating in the import-competing sector desire a certain degree of monetary autonomy. They are not affected by the uncertainty associated with varying exchange rates and therefore have no fundamental interest in stable currencies. This applies also to producers of non-tradable services who do not operate in an international context.
In summary, it can be stated that all internationally oriented actors prefer currency stability, while domestically oriented actors accept the costs of greater currency instability and prefer monetary autonomy (Frieden 1991, 446) . Considering the predictions made by the production factor and the economic sector model, several different groups with preferences for either monetary autonomy or for exchange rate stability can be identified. Namely, the production factor labor, the importcompeting sector, and the non-tradable services sector have a preference for monetary autonomy, whereas the production factor capital, the export-competing sector, the banking sector, and international investors prefer exchange rate stability.
3.) Translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes
After the identification of different preferences for either monetary autonomy or exchange rate stability, it is necessary to scrutinize in a second step how those preferences are translated into monetary policy outcomes. There are two main theoretical frameworks for those translation processes which will be introduced and contrasted below.
3.1) Economic pluralism
The theory of economic pluralism argues that policy outcomes are a function of the political competition between different societal actors which is determined by their relative power and their propensity for collective action (Garrett and Lange 1995, 628) . Rooted in a liberal theory of international politics (Moravcsik 1997) , pluralism assumes that the dominant groups in a society will finally implement their favored policies. Therefore, Dahl has connected the emergence of pluralism to a particular kind of regime termed 'polyarchy' (Dahl 1978, 191) . While hegemonic regimes thwart the development of pluralism, polyarchies are more open to organised opposition and thereby induce the formation of a pluralistic order. 12 In such political systems, political institutions regard interest groups as partners rather than as opponents. They try to establish cooperation with each other, relying on mutual acquiescence and approval (Hill and Varone 2014, 27) . Pluralism assumes that various interest groups have open and equal access to policy-making and shape the policy process according to their respective aims (Chari and Kritzinger 2006, 44) . As a consequence, pluralism leads to a balance of interests as it satisfies each tendency in the society in proportion to its relative 12 Democractic states come most close to the polyarchic ideal and are therefore most suitable for pluralism.
representation in the population (Pizzorno 1981, 259) . Following the logic of pluralism, government institutions just provide the arena for group competition and do not exert a significant impact on policy decisions themselves (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988, 7) . Therefore, politicians have not an autonomous role of policy shaping but instead they follow the will of the powerful actors in a country which emerge as dominant pressure groups (Becker 1983, 396 ).
Applied to the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability, the pluralist theory suggests that a state will either strive for monetary policy autonomy in case that groups with such a preference predominate in a society or pursue exchange rate stability in case that groups with the opposite preference are superior. Thus, the distribution of the size and strength of different societal groups will shape monetary policy outcomes. Connecting this rationale to the preference patterns discussed above, it can be assumed that the respective size of those economic actors shapes the monetary policy choice. More specifically, according to the pluralist logic it is expected that the size of the export-competing sector, the import-competing sector, the banking sector as well as the size of unionized workforce influence the choice between monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability. Based on this assumption, I will examine the following hypotheses to test the theory of economic pluralism:
H1: Countries with higher percentages of exports to total GDP have higher degrees of exchange rate stability.
H2:
Countries with higher percentages of imports to total GDP have a higher degree of monetary autonomy.
H3: Countries with a higher percentage of unionized workforce to total salary earners have a higher degree of monetary autonomy.
H4:
Countries with a larger banking sector have a higher degree of exchange rate stability.
H5:
Countries with a higher percentage of workers to gross capital formation have a higher degree of monetary autonomy.
3.2) The 'party-as-agent model' from David Bearce
David Bearce provides in his paper an alternative theory for the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes. Building on a principal-agent approach, he emphasizes the crucial role of the partisan character of governments for the choice of monetary policies.
His point of departure is the fact that leftist parties are traditionally the protectors of labor interests and that rightist parties often form close alliances with capital owners. By focusing on the US context, Bearce argues that less-skilled manual workers in the import-competing manufacturing sector and white-collar workers in the service sector are a solid leftist constituency. In contrast, skilled-manual workers which often work in export-oriented industries, capital-intensive industries and investment banks are closely aligned with the political right. Considering the different preference patterns elucidated above, Bearce infers that leftist political parties advocate the interests of societal groups with preferences for monetary autonomy and that rightist political parties represent the interests of societal actors with preferences for exchange rate stability. He assumes that a delegation process from actors with particular monetary policy preferences to political parties takes place, whereby he regards the societal groups as principals and political parties as agents. In the desire to fulfil the policy preferences of their respective principals, leftist governments pursue an autonomous monetary policy and rightist governments implement stable exchange rates. Thus, the central indicator of a country's monetary policy is the partisan character of its respective government.
Since this theory is grounded on the rather utopian assumption that governments are solely interested in the preferences of their voters, Bearce also introduces a variation of his theory. This variation accounts for the fact that vote-seeking governments care also about the interests of powerful actors within a society. In the framework of the principal-agent-model, governments are perceived as 'shirking' when they act against the preferences of their principals. Terming his variation approach as party-as-agent model with significant shirking, he tries to make sense out of the fact that governments pursue also strategic vote-seeking goals and that they are not pure policy-seekers. While the party-as-agent model with significant shirking assumes an interplay between economic pluralism and discretion of government parties, I will focus here on testing the party-as-agent model in its pure form. If there is cumulative evidence for economic pluralism and the party-as-agent model, then the party-as-agent model with significant shirking would be the theoretical framework which the strongest predictive power. But a necessary condition therefor is that I find in a first step evidence for an impact of government ideologies on monetary policy outcomes. Thus, I examine the party-asagent model in its pure form by testing the following hypotheses:
H6: Countries with more leftist governments have higher degrees of monetary autonomy.
H7:
Countries with more rightist governments have higher degrees of exchange rate stability.
3.3) Critical discussion of David Bearce's 'party-as-agent model'
Several points of criticism should be considered with regard to the party-as-agent model. First, the party-as-agent model makes very optimistic assumptions about the ability and willingness of government parties to pursue the favored policies of their voters. It assumes that a government is determined to implement the preferred policies of its voters irrespective of opposition from various powerful actors in the society. Previous research has demonstrated that governments are not immune against pressures from interest groups and especially not against pressure from powerful business entrepreneurs (Golden 1998; Klüver 2009; Yackee and Yackee 2006) . A remarkable example for the significant influence of interest groups on policy outcomes is the lobbying of the National Rifle Association in the US against gun control which is successful against the majority's preference for a more restricted gun control (Dearden 2015) . Ignoring such impacts, the party-asagent model treats government parties as pure policy-seeking actors which try to implement the policies they promised to their voters. In contrast to this assumption, a multitude of studies showed that governments are also motivated by vote-seeking goals and that they often act strategically to reassure their re-election (Crisp et al. 2004; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007) .
Secondly, it is not entirely clear why leftist parties should always support monetary autonomy and rightist parties categorically prefer exchange-rate stability. Bearce's theory is rooted in the US-context where skilled manual workers are often found in the export-oriented industries whereas less-skilled manual workers are generally trapped in the import-competing manufacturing sector (Bearce 2003, 381) . However, in several other OECD countries this generalization does not hold. For example in Norway many low-skilled manual workers work in the export-oriented crude oil industry representing typical clients for left-wing parties. It seems to be an oversimplification to regard leftist parties categorically as agents of actors with preferences for monetary autonomy and rightist parties always as agents of actors who prefer exchange-rate stability.
Thirdly, Bearce employs a one-dimensional left-right heuristic of party ideologies which is a strong simplification of reality. This might work for the American context with only two parties to be classified but the party structure in other OECD countries is often far more complex. Taking into account this polymorphic character of ideology, it has become a standard to differentiate between the economic and sociopolitical dimension when classifying party ideologies (Bräuninger and Debus 2011) . Bearce fails to acknowledge those different dimensions and treats party ideologies as onedimensional categorizing them on a scale ranging from 1 up to 5. This problem will be encountered with a more fine-grained measure of party ideology which will be elaborated in the methodological section below.
4.) Methods
The methodological section is divided into three parts. First, I will critically evaluate the measures used by Bearce. Afterwards, I describe my own variables and their operationalizations and subsequently I introduce my statistical model.
4.1) Critique of David Bearce's methods
The central weakness of Bearce's study is the fact that he measures his central theoretical innovation, namely the party-as-agent model, with a rather superficial and crude proxy variable. The ideological complexion of the respective government in power is captured with a five-point scale where lower values indicate more right-wing ideologies (Bearce 2003, 386 ). This variable is taken from the Party Government Data Set established by the University of Amsterdam (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 2000) . They categorize the ideology of parties in a highly simplistic way as either left, central, or right.
In a second step, they account for the relative strength of parties in government by transforming the proportional shares of right, center and left parties into scores ranging from 1 till 5 representing the degree of representation of the different ideologies. The grounding of Bearce's study on such a crude variable, based on a breakdown of the complex issue of ideology to a three categories indicator, raises severe doubts to the validity of his results. Additionally, the operationalization of his central dependent variable, namely monetary autonomy, seems to be prone to measurement errors. Bearce measures monetary autonomy with the differential between a country's domestic interest rate and the prevailing world interest rate (Bearce 2003, 385) . Hereby, the prevailing world interest rate is operationalized with the average interest rate of the US, Japan, Germany, Britain and France. Bearce does not provide a theoretical justification for choosing those countries and in an increasingly globalized world, it seems questionable whether the monetary policy of countries like Britain and France is as influential as the monetary policy of raising economic players such as China, India or Brazil. The recent inclusion of the Chinese Yuan to the SDR basket of reserve-currencies by the IMF (Mathew 2015) illustrates the growing importance of other currencies and shows that they also significantly impact the prevailing world interest rate. Acknowledging the difficulties of capturing such latent concepts as monetary policy autonomy and government ideology, this analysis aims to improve their measurement by using more sophisticated and fine-grained measures that have been developed by other scholars.
4.2) Variables and Data Sources
For the purpose of my re-analysis, I use the same variables as Bearce, but the variables originate from other sources with different operationalizations.
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The main dependent variable 'monetary autonomy' will be operationalized with the so-called 14 By comparing a country's monetary policy to a respective base country, he is able to detect autonomous policy choices along these three dimensions. The choice of the respective base country builds on a study by Shambaugh who classifies countries' currencies as pegged or nonpegged and identifies to which country the monetary policy is most closely linked to (Shambaugh 2004) . The application of Aizenman's monetary independence index has two significant advantages. First, it does not rely on an arbitrary choice of the prevailing world interest rate but compares closely connected currencies. Secondly, the standardization between 0 and 1 facilitates the interpretation of the achievement along the three dimensions of the impossible trilemma.
The proxy variable for the party-as-agent model tries to overcome the weaknesses of Bearce's simplistic measure of government ideology discussed above. In contrast to Bearce, I use a very sophisticated and fine-grained indicator developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to 13 In distinction from Bearce, I do not control for central bank independence, the size of the non-tradable service sector and outward foreign direct investments since the amount of missing cases for those variables decrease the number of observations used for the analysis in an inadequate way. 14 Further information about the operationalizations of the three dimension of the impossible trilemma is illustrated in the appendix.
measure the ideological orientation of a country's government (Lehmann et al. 2015) . trinity (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008) . The degree of fractionalization is operationalized with the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties and the information is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001 ). Finally, the proportional representation dummy originates from a publication by Strøm et al. about arrangements of powersharing (Strøm et al. 2013 ).
5.) Statistical model
In line with Bearce, I analyze the total of OECD countries since for those countries a sufficient data basis exists. However, I will not only use data for the timeframe between 1975 and 1992, but also cover the whole period between 1960 and 2010.
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The use of OLS regression with time-series cross-sectional data has some difficulties which have to be reflected in the analysis. Data which varies also in the time-dimension is more problematic for OLS than pure cross-sectional data since observations are usually not independent (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329) . This leads to four common violations of OLS assumptions with dependent variable, there is the risk that the lagged dependent variable dramatically affects other coefficients in the model and in the meanwhile exaggerates the model fit (Achen 2000, 3) .
In a second step, I cross-check the results of OLS regression with a fixed effects model. In so doing, I deviate from Bearce's analysis which is only based on the results of his OLS regression analysis. But using OLS is generally problematic with pooled data since it ignores the panel structure of the data (Schmidheiny 2005, 5) . It simply lumps all the observations together and treats them as one crosssection. To overcome this problematic simplification, I run a model which accounts as well for the time-variation of the data. In a first step, I decide whether a random or a fixed effects model is suitable. The main distinction between fixed and random effects models is based on "whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model" (Greene 2008, 183) . The central finding is the non-significance of the variable which indicates the government ideology.
At odds with the party-as-agent theory, both models indicate no significant influence of the 17 The sign is in the opposite direction as predicted by hypothesis two. The same applies for Bearce's study where the import-and export-variables have also signs in the same directions in two models at odds with his hypotheses. This is due to the fact that imports as percent of total GDP is not exactly measuring the potential political strength of the import-competing sector. A better measure would have been to subtract exports from total manufacturers. However, for the purpose of the re-analysis, I decided to follow the measure used by Bearce. This confirms the assumption of hypothesis 5. Several limitations have to be considered when drawing inferences from the results. First, even though the applied measures strive to be more sophisticated than the ones used by Bearce, it is still questionable whether they are able to capture the latent concepts of monetary autonomy and government ideology in an adequate way. Secondly, this analysis cannot overcome the problems associated with a one-dimensional measure of government ideology. The measure based on CMP is also ignoring the differentiation between the economic and the sociopolitical dimension of party ideologies. Thirdly, an extended analysis including the non-OECD countries would enhance the generalizability of the results but could not be realized due to data limitations. Fourthly, the analysis is based on the assumption that every citizen has at least any preference towards the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability. This is highly questionable since some basic economic knowledge is essential to understand the implications of the trade-off predicted by the Mundell-Fleming model. Furthermore, even if societal groups held preferences for one or another goal, it is doubtful whether they are able to organize themselves to promote their interest.
Especially large groups face always a collective action problem (Olson 1965) and often fail to organize lobbying. Therefore, it would be necessary to buttress the evidence for economic pluralism with qualitative evidence of lobbying by different societal actors towards the achievement of monetary policy goals.
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Being aware of those limitations, this study claims nevertheless to make a modest contribution to the understanding of the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes. 19 Bearce claims that such lobbying was historically often non-existent but he infers this assumption by considering only the US-context.
